ARGENTINA: The Return of the "Cacerolazo"

Thousands of middle-class Argentines took to the streets late Tuesday in a "cacerolazo" or pot-banging protest, this time against the centre-left government of President Cristina Fernández, showing that the methods learned in the crisis that broke out in late 2001 are still alive.

"The social and political memory is not in our minds, but in our bodies. Faced with the need to mark limits for political action by a government, society acts based on what it has learned," sociologist Federico Schuster, dean of the social science department at the University of Buenos Aires, told IPS.

"Neighbourhood assemblies, `piquetes' (roadblocks) and `cacerolazos' were very strong experiences that are latent but still alive. The return to a certain institutional normalcy does not mean that this spirit of rebellion has completely disappeared. In the face of a new disappointment, the mechanisms are activated," said the professor.

However, there is an enormous difference between the contexts in which the current protests are taking place and those that brought down the government of Fernando De la Rúa in December 2001.

While Argentina was already in a deep recession back in late 2001, the crisis facing Fernández today is occurring in the midst of strong economic recovery and a heated debate on how the country's growing wealth should be distributed.

One common denominator, however, is the lack of mechanisms for mediation in conflicts between the government and civil society.

"The government should encourage the creation of decentralised spaces for debate in different sectors of society, which would enable it to maintain a dialogue with everyone, especially in times of crisis. Because it is not enough to just vote every four years," said Schuster.

The current conflict broke out two weeks ago, when the government announced a new sliding scale of higher taxes on grain exports, which were increased from 35 to 44 percent in the case of soybeans and from 32 to 39 percent in the case of sunflowers, for example.

The new taxes, announced on Mar. 11, will vary depending on international grain prices, rising as prices go up or shrinking as they drop.

The measure was immediately protested by small, medium and large farmers, who are enjoying a boom period thanks to their own efficient production methods, the rallying of global markets and soaring demand for commodities, and support from the state by means of fuel subsidies and a competitive exchange rate.

For the past two weeks, farmers have been staging roadblocks around the country. At first, they blocked the passage of trucks carrying grains. But the lack of dialogue between the rural associations and the government has fuelled the confrontation, and the traffic blockades are now targeting trucks transporting any kind of food in towns and cities in many of the country's provinces.

The farm strike has led to the dumping of millions of litres of milk that could not be sold, and to the slaughter on Tuesday of 400,000 chicks which were waiting in vain for their feed.

Shortages of fresh produce and other farm products have already begun to be felt in supermarkets and shops in Buenos Aires.

The government, meanwhile, has refused to roll back the new tax. The president said Tuesday that the roadblocks, by contrast with the "piquetes" staged by groups of unemployed workers in the late 1990s, are "piquetes of abundance," and stated that she would not be subject to "extortion."

"How else can wealth be distributed but from those sectors enjoying windfall profits?" asked Fernandez, who pointed out that in 2003 the state came to the rescue of tens of thousands of bankrupt farmers on the verge of losing their land.

In response to the president's statements and her refusal to negotiate, thousands of people, mainly from upscale neighbourhoods in Buenos Aires and other cities, took to the streets to clang pots and pans, as they did during the late 2001 crisis.

The most determined demonstrators marched spontaneously towards the Plaza de Mayo, outside of the Casa Rosada (the seat of government), and to the doors of the Olivos presidential residency, while others gathered on street corners.

Some complained about the government's failure to engage in dialogue, others defended the right of farmers to their growing profit margin, and many were simply expressing angry opposition to the government.

Protests were not seen in poor suburbs of the capital, or in the metropolitan area, where people followed events on TV.

In response to the unexpected demonstration, "piquetero" groups (of unemployed workers) that support the Fernández administration took to the streets and forced the "cacerolazo" protesters to break up.

A few hours later, the government once again confirmed that the farm export tax hike would remain in place, and threatened to call out the police to break up the roadblocks on rural highways.

Justice Minister Anibal Fernández warned Wednesday that the security forces would remove the traffic blockades to allow the trucks to get through with grains and food supplies. "If they don't move, we'll move them ourselves," said the minister. "Those who do not allow the traffic through will go to jail."

Economy Minister Martín Lousteau said the "cacerolazo" was "staged and instigated by opposition leaders" among "the urban upper middle class, who have nothing to do with the rural sector."

But observers agree that, although the opposition parties were represented in the streets and their leaders have attempted to make political hay out of the protests, the demonstrations in the cities were spontaneous.

"It was a major event, and its significance cannot be played down. The government is not going to be the same after this," said Schuster, who wrote the Argentine chapter of the book "The New Left in Latin America", which was written by a diverse group of social scientists from around the region.

In his chapter, Schuster said that shortly after he took office, former president Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), Fernández's husband, demobilised social movements that had emerged during the 2001-2002 economic crisis and the preceding years of recession.

By means of strategies aimed at recuperating a degree of control over the discontent, Kirchner, "instead of taking advantage of the momentum of the decentralised protests that emerged in those years, silenced the movements."

"He did not have a strategy to mobilise citizens, and that is not advisable if you plan to confront large vested interests," the academic wrote at the time.

The strategy aimed at getting people to demobilise "might be effective in the short term, but in the medium term it will be counterproductive for the government itself," Schuster warned in 2004. "Experiences don't die, they are mechanisms that can be activated at any time. If the government is truly progressive, it will need to awaken that."

But that is not what has happened. At the end of his term, Kirchner announced that he would focus on rebuilding the Justicialista (Peronist) Party, to provide his wife's government with a solid political base. According to Schuster, however, "the old way of doing politics will not suffice to keep a lid on these new forms of participation."