Vragen en antwoorden over kartelvorming (en)

Met dank overgenomen van Europese Commissie (EC) i, gepubliceerd op woensdag 15 oktober 2008.

What is a cartel?

It is an illegal secret agreement concluded between competitors to fix prices, restrict supply and/or divide up markets. The agreement may take a wide variety of forms but often relates to sales prices or increases in such prices, restrictions on sales or production capacities, sharing out of product or geographic markets or customers, and collusion on the other commercial conditions for the sale of products or services.

Why are cartels harmful to consumers, businesses and to the economy in general?

Cartels shield participants from competition allowing them to charge higher prices and removing the pressure on them to improve the products they sell or find more efficient ways in which to produce them. It is the customers (companies and consumers) who foot the bill in terms of paying higher prices for lower quality and narrower choice. This not only makes consumers and businesses suffer but also adversely affects the competitiveness of the economy as a whole.

What legal basis underpins the Commission’s action to combat cartels?

Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community prohibits agreements and concerted practices between firms that distort competition within the Single Market. Fines of up to 10% of their worldwide turnover may be imposed on the guilty parties.

What happens to the proceeds from fines?

The amount of the fines is paid into the Community budget. The fines therefore help to finance the European Union and reduce the tax burden on individuals.

Does the Commission have the last word?

All cartel decisions by the Commission may be appealed against before the Court of First Instance (CFI) and then before the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg. They can, therefore, be closely scrutinised by these two courts, which are empowered to annul decisions in whole or in part and to reduce or increase fines, where this is deemed appropriate.

What is the European Commission’s leniency programme?

It encourages firms to provide the Commission with insider information on cartels. The first firm to do so is granted total immunity from fines. Other firms that follow suit may be granted a reduction in the amount of the fine. This policy is very effective in uncovering cartels but does not prevent the Commission from conducting investigations on its own initiative. For further information, see IP/06/1705, MEMO/06/469 and MEMO/06/470. Companies wishing to approach the Commission in order to benefit from the Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases should consult:

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.cfm

What practical steps has the Commission taken to step up action against cartels?

Since June 2005 an entire Directorate composed of five units (Directorate G, with a staff of around 70) in the Competition Directorate General has been involved exclusively in helping the Commission to detect and punish cartels.

What action is open to consumers and companies who feel that they have been victims of such illegal agreements?

Any firm or individual adversely affected by practices censured by the Commission, such as those set out in today's decision, may bring the matter before a court in a Member State of the European Union with a view to seeking compensation for damage suffered as a result of such practices. Fines imposed by the Commission are different from the damages awarded by national courts. While action for damages before a court can also have a certain deterrent effect, its main purpose is to compensate victims of anti-competitive behaviour or to secure compensation for damage suffered. A Commission Green Paper on facilitating action for damages before courts in the Member States was published in December 2005.

What are the ten largest fines imposed by the Commission in cartel cases?

By company:

 

Firm

Fine (euros)

Year

ThyssenKrupp1 (IP/07/209)

479 669 850

2007

Hoffmann-La Roche AG (IP/01/1625)

462 000 000

2001

Siemens AG1 (IP/07/80)

396 562 500

2007

Sasol Limited (IP/08/1434)

318 200 000

2008

ENI SpA1 (IP/06/1647)

272 250 000

2006

Lafarge SA3 (IP/02/1744)

249 600 000

2002

BASF AG2 (IP/01/1625)

236 845 000

2001

Otis1 (IP/07/209)

224 932 950

2007

Heineken NV1 (IP/07/509)

219Â 275Â 000

2007

Arkema1 (IP/06/698)

219 131 250

2006

By sector:

 

Sector

Year

Total (euros)

Elevators and escalators1

2007

992 312 200

Vitamins2

2001

790 505 000

Gas insulated switchgear1

2007

750 512 500

Paraffin waxes

2008

676 011 400

Synthetic rubber (BR/ESBR)1

2006

519 050 000

Flat Glass1

2007

486 900 000

Plasterboard2

2002

458 520 000

Hydrogen peroxide1

2006

388 128 000

Acrylic glass1

2006

344 562 500

Hard Haberdashery1: Fasteners

2007

328 644 000

Fines imposed on cartels by the Commission since 2003:

 

Year

Sector covered by cartel

Number of undertakings subject to decision

Total fine (euros)

2008

Bananas (IP/08/1509)

3

60 300 000

2008

Paraffin Waxes (IP/08/1434)

10

676 011 400

2008

Aluminium fluoride (IP/08/1007)

4

4 970 000

2008

Sodium chlorate1 (IP/08/917)

4

79 070 000

2008

International Removal Services1 (IP/08/415)

10

32Â 755Â 500

2008

Nitrile Butadiene Rubber (IP/08/78)

2

34 230 000

2007

Chloroprene Rubber1 (IP/07/1855)

6

247 635 000

2007

Flat glass1 (IP/07/1781)

4

486Â 900Â 000

2007

Professional videotape (IP/07/1725)

3

74Â 790Â 000

2007

Bitumen Spain1 (IP/07/1438)

5

183Â 651Â 000

2007

Hard Haberdashery: Fasteners1 (IP/07/1362)

7

328 644 000

2007

Dutch beer market1 (IP/07/509)

4

273Â 783Â 000

2007

Elevators and escalators1 (IP/07/209)

5

992 312 200

2007

Gas insulated switchgear1 (IP/07/80)1

11

750 512 500

2006

Alloy surcharge (re-adoption)1 (IP/06/1851)

1

3 168 000

2006

Synthetic rubber (BR/ESBR)1 (IP/06/1647)

6

519 050 000

2006

Steel beams (re-adoption)1 (IP/06/1527)

1

10 000 000

2006

Copper fittings1 (IP/06/1222)

11

314 760 000

2006

Bitumen Netherlands1 (IP/06/1179)

14

266 717 000

2006

Acrylic Glass1 (IP/06/698)

5

344 562 500

2006

Hydrogen Peroxide1 (IP/06/560)

9

388 128 000

2005

Rubber chemicals1 (IP/05/1656)

4

75 860 000

2005

Industrial bags1 (IP/05/1508)

16

290 710 000

2005

Italian tobacco1 (IP/05/1315)

6

56 052 000

2005

Industrial thread1 (IP/05/1140)

11

43 497 000

2005

Monochloroacetic acid1 (IP/05/61)

4

216 910 000

2004

Choline chloride3 (IP/04/1454)

6

57 884 000

2004

Haberdashery products: needles3 (IP/04/1313)

3

47 000 000

2004

Spanish tobacco1 (IP/04/1256)

9

20 038 000

2004

French beer1 (IP/04/1153)

2

2 500 000

2004

Sodium gluconate1 (IP/01/1355)

1

19 040 000

2004

Copper plumbing tubes1 (IP/04/1065)

9

222 291 100

2003

Industrial pipes1 (IP/03/1746)

3

78 730 000

2003

Organic peroxides1 (IP/03/1700)

6

69 531 000

2003

Carbon and graphite products1 (IP/03/1651)

6

101 440 000

2003

Sorbates2 (IP/03/1330)

5

138 400 000

2003

Viandes bovines3 (IP/03/479)

6

12 690 000

1 Appeal lodged before the CFI

2 Following judgment by the CFI

3 Appeal lodged before the CoJ